(DOWNLOAD) "State v. Donat F. Cote" by Supreme Court of New Hampshire " eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: State v. Donat F. Cote
- Author : Supreme Court of New Hampshire
- Release Date : January 19, 1948
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 52 KB
Description
PerCuriam.Since the defendants reside or have their principal place of business in Hillsborough County, it is contended that
this proceeding may not be brought in Merrimack County and should be abated. We may assume with counsel that the state is
governed by the venue statute (R. L., c. 384, s. 1) which reads as follows: "1. Transitory.Transitory actions, in which any
one of the parties is an inhabitant of the state, shall be brought in the county where some one of them resides. If no one
of the parties is an inhabitant of the state the action may be brought in any county." There are some early cases holding
that a state cannot be considered an inhabitant of or residing in any county but there is common acceptance of the principle
that the state is regarded as having its principal place of business in the county where its capitol is located. Merely because
the state embraces all counties is no ground for saying that it resides in none. Such reasoning would relegate the state to
the status of a non-resident corporation doing business within the state (Blanchette v. Company, 90 N.H. 207 ) and there is
no persuasive reason to believe the legislature so intended. The statute and the decisions make it clear that venue is based
on what "Justice or convenience requires" (R. L., c. 384, s. 3) and a technical interpretation is not favored. McCauley v.
Brooks, 84 N.H. 207. In any case the statute permits a change of venue when required in the interests of Justice. R. L., c.
384, s. 3. The motion to abate was therefore correctly denied and the proceedings were properly brought in Merrimack County
where the capitol is located. Objection is made that there is no evidence to support the finding of the Court that discovery and inspection was necessary
in this proceeding. The Court was not required to take a view (R. L., c. 395, s. 21) but having done so the manner and extent
of the view and inspection was largely discretionary. State v. Langelier, ante 97; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 78 N.H. 440. The
general finding of the Court was one that could be made on the basis of the allegations of the bill in equity, the view and
inspection and the arguments of counsel. Vidal v. Errol, 86 N.H. 585. The right to discovery and inspection is necessarily
preliminary, remedial and discretionary and is favored as a method "to ascertain the truth by rational means" (Taylor v. Thomas,
77 N.H. 410, 411) in order that the case may be decided on the basis of pertinent evidence rather than the rules of evidence.
R. L., c. 371, s. 1; Lefebvre v. Somersworth Co., 93 N.H. 354. Since the inspection was necessary for the plaintiff to prepare
its case (Davis v. Company, 79 N.H. 377) and was granted under the supervision and control of a master with authority to determine
materiality of records inspected, there were proper safeguards of the rights of the defendants. Ingram v. Railroad, 89 N.H.
277.
 "State v. Donat F. Cote" by Supreme Court of New Hampshire " eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free){kind=link}